Your supervisor has asked you to create a training on homicide investigations for your coworkers. This training will be in two parts.
Part 1: Classification of Homicides
On one page, create a table to be a job aid comparing the different types of homicides. The table template is attached for both parts.
Part 2: Case Analysis
In the second part of your training, you will analyze a closed homicide case in your community or as close to your community as possible (In the state of South Carolina). In 2 pages, summarize the investigation into your selected case. Your analysis should:
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1. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20
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S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20
This document is current through 2022 Regular Session Act No. 148, not including changes and corrections made by the Code Commissioner.
South Carolina Code of Laws Annotated by LexisNexis® > Title 16. Crimes and Offenses (Chs. 1 — 27) > Chapter 3. Offenses Against the Person (Arts. 1 — 20) > Article 1. Homicide (§§ 16-3-5 — 16-3-95)
§ 16-3-20. Punishment for murder; separate sentencing proceeding when death penalty sought.
(A) A person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to murder must be punished by death, or by a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for thirty years to life. If the State seeks the death penalty and a statutory aggravating circumstance is found beyond a reasonable doubt pursuant to subsections (B) and (C), and a recommendation of death is not made, the trial judge must impose a sentence of life imprisonment. For purposes of this section, “life” or “life imprisonment” means until death of the offender without the possibility of parole, and when requested by the State or the defendant, the judge must charge the jury in his instructions that life imprisonment means until the death of the defendant without the possibility of parole. In cases where the defendant is eligible for parole, the judge must charge the applicable parole eligibility statute. No person sentenced to life imprisonment pursuant to this section is eligible for parole, community supervision, or any early release program, nor is the person eligible to receive any work credits, education credits, good conduct credits, or any other credits that would reduce the mandatory life imprisonment required by this section. No person sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for thirty years to life pursuant to this section is eligible for parole or any early release program, nor is the person eligible to receive any work credits, education credits, good conduct credits, or any other credits that would reduce the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for thirty years to life required by this section. Under no circumstances may a female who is pregnant be executed so long as she is pregnant or for a period of at least nine months after she is no longer pregnant. When the Governor commutes a sentence of death to life imprisonment under the provisions of Section 14, Article IV of the Constitution of South Carolina, 1895, the commutee is not eligible for parole, community supervision, or any early release program, nor is the person eligible to receive any work credits, good conduct credits, education credits, or any other credits that would reduce the mandatory imprisonment required by this subsection.
(B) When the State seeks the death penalty, upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of murder, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding. In the proceeding, if a statutory aggravating circumstance is found, the defendant must be sentenced to either death or life imprisonment. If no statutory aggravating circumstance is found, the defendant must be sentenced to either life imprisonment or a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for thirty years to life. The proceeding must be conducted by the trial judge before the trial jury as soon as practicable after the lapse of twenty-four hours unless waived by the defendant. If trial by jury has been waived by the defendant and the State, or if the defendant pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding must be conducted before the judge. In the sentencing proceeding, the jury or judge shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, or aggravation of the punishment. Only such evidence in aggravation as the State has informed the defendant in writing before the trial is admissible. This section must not be construed to authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the State of South Carolina or the applicable laws of either. The State, the defendant, and his counsel are permitted to present arguments for or against the sentence to be imposed. The defendant and his counsel shall have the closing argument regarding the sentence to be imposed.
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(C) The judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for it to consider, mitigating circumstances otherwise authorized or allowed by law and the following statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances which may be supported by the evidence:
(a) Statutory aggravating circumstances:
(1) The murder was committed while in the commission of the following crimes or acts:
(a) criminal sexual conduct in any degree;
(b) kidnapping;
(c) trafficking in persons;
(d) burglary in any degree;
(e) robbery while armed with a deadly weapon;
(f) larceny with use of a deadly weapon;
(g) killing by poison;
(h) drug trafficking as defined in Section 44-53-370(e), 44-53-375(B), 44-53-440, or 44-53-445;
(i) physical torture;
(j) dismemberment of a person; or
(k) arson in the first degree as defined in Section 16-11-110(A).
(2) The murder was committed by a person with a prior conviction for murder.
(3) The offender by his act of murder knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon or device which normally would be hazardous to the lives of more than one person.
(4) The offender committed the murder for himself or another for the purpose of receiving money or a thing of monetary value.
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, solicitor, former solicitor, or other officer of the court during or because of the exercise of his official duty.
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder as an agent or employee of another person.
(7) The murder of a federal, state, or local law enforcement officer or former federal, state, or local law enforcement officer, peace officer or former peace officer, corrections officer or former corrections officer, including a county or municipal corrections officer or a former county or municipal corrections officer, a county or municipal detention facility employee or former county or municipal detention facility employee, or fireman or former fireman during or because of the performance of his official duties.
(8) The murder of a family member of an official listed in subitems (5) and (7) above with the intent to impede or retaliate against the official. “Family member” means a spouse, parent, brother, sister, child, or person to whom the official stands in the place of a parent or a person living in the official’s household and related to him by blood or marriage.
(9) Two or more persons were murdered by the defendant by one act or pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct.
(10) The murder of a child eleven years of age or under.
(11) The murder of a witness or potential witness committed at any time during the criminal process for the purpose of impeding or deterring prosecution of any crime.
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S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20
(12) The murder was committed by a person deemed a sexually violent predator pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 48, Title 44, or a person deemed a sexually violent predator who is released pursuant to Section 44-48-120.
(b) Mitigating circumstances:
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal conviction involving the use of violence against another person.
(2) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance.
(3) The victim was a participant in the defendant’s conduct or consented to the act.
(4) The defendant was an accomplice in the murder committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor.
(5) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person.
(6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.
(7) The age or mentality of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(8) The defendant was provoked by the victim into committing the murder.
(9) The defendant was below the age of eighteen at the time of the crime.
(10) The defendant had mental retardation at the time of the crime. “Mental retardation” means significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental period.
The statutory instructions as to statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances must be given in charge and in writing to the jury for its deliberation. The jury, if its verdict is a recommendation of death, shall designate in writing, and signed by all members of the jury, the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury, if it does not recommend death, after finding a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, shall designate in writing, and signed by all members of the jury, the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances it found beyond a reasonable doubt. In nonjury cases the judge shall make the designation of the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances. Unless at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in this section is found, the death penalty must not be imposed.
Where a statutory aggravating circumstance is found and a recommendation of death is made, the trial judge shall sentence the defendant to death. The trial judge, before imposing the death penalty, shall find as an affirmative fact that the death penalty was warranted under the evidence of the case and was not a result of prejudice, passion, or any other arbitrary factor. Where a statutory aggravating circumstance is found and a sentence of death is not recommended by the jury, the trial judge shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment as provided in subsection (A). Before dismissing the jury, the trial judge shall question the jury as to whether or not it found a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. If the jury does not unanimously find any statutory aggravating circumstances or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall not make a sentencing recommendation. Where a statutory aggravating circumstance is not found, the trial judge shall sentence the defendant to either life imprisonment or a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for thirty years. No person sentenced to life imprisonment or a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for thirty years under this section is eligible for parole or to receive any work credits, good conduct credits, education credits, or any other credits that would reduce the sentence required by this section. If the jury has found a statutory
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aggravating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury shall designate this finding, in writing, signed by all the members of the jury. The jury shall not recommend the death penalty if the vote for such penalty is not unanimous as provided. If members of the jury after a reasonable deliberation cannot agree on a recommendation as to whether or not the death sentence should be imposed on a defendant found guilty of murder, the trial judge shall dismiss such jury and shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment as provided in subsection (A).
(D) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14-7-1020, in cases involving capital punishment a person called as a juror must be examined by the attorney for the defense.
(E) In a criminal action in which a defendant is charged with a crime which may be punishable by death, a person may not be disqualified, excused, or excluded from service as a juror by reason of his beliefs or attitudes against capital punishment unless such beliefs or attitudes would render him unable to return a verdict according to law.
History
1962 Code § 16-52; 1952 Code § 16-52; 1942 Code § 1102; 1932 Code § 1102; Cr. C. ‘22 § 2; Cr. C. ‘12 § 136; Cr. C. ‘02 § 109; G. S. 2454; R. S. 109; 1868 (14) 175; 1894 (21) 785; 1974 (58) 2361; 1977 Act No. 177 § 1; 1978 Act No. 555 § 1; 1985 Act No. 104, § 1; 1986 Act No. 462, § 27; 1990 Act No. 604, § 15; 1992 Act No. 488, § 1; 1995 Act No. 83, § 10; 1996 Act No. 317, § 1; 2002 Act No. 224, § 1, eff May 1, 2002 (applicable to offenses committed on or after that date); 2002 Act No. 278, § 1, eff May 28, 2002; 2006 Act No. 342, § 2, eff July 1, 2006; 2007 Act No. 101, § 1, eff June 18, 2007; 2010 Act No. 273, § 21, eff June 2, 2010; 2010 Act No. 289, § 4, eff June 11, 2010.
Annotations
Notes to Decisions
Constitutional Law: Congressional Duties & Powers: Ex Post Facto Clause & Bills of Attainder: General Overview
Constitutional Law: The Judiciary: Case or Controversy: Constitutionality of Legislation: General Overview
Constitutional Law: The Judiciary: Case or Controversy: Ripeness
Constitutional Law: Bill of Rights: Fundamental Rights: Criminal Process: Assistance of Counsel
Constitutional Law: Bill of Rights: Fundamental Rights: Criminal Process: Cruel & Unusual Punishment
Constitutional Law: Bill of Rights: Fundamental Rights: Criminal Process: Right to Jury Trial
Constitutional Law: Equal Protection: Scope of Protection
Criminal Law & Procedure: Criminal Offenses: Crimes Against Persons: Assault & Battery: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Criminal Offenses: Crimes Against Persons: Domestic Offenses: Children: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Criminal Offenses: Crimes Against Persons: Kidnapping: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Criminal Offenses: Crimes Against Persons: Robbery: General Overview
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S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20
Criminal Law & Procedure: Criminal Offenses: Homicide: Murder: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Criminal Offenses: Homicide: Murder: Capital Murder: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Criminal Offenses: Homicide: Murder: Felony Murder: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Criminal Offenses: Homicide: Voluntary Manslaughter: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Criminal Offenses: Miscellaneous Offenses: Lesser Included Offenses: Homicide
Criminal Law & Procedure: Criminal Offenses: Property Crimes: Burglary & Criminal Trespass: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Criminal Offenses: Sex Crimes: Sexual Assault: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Accessories: Accessory Before the Fact
Criminal Law & Procedure: Juvenile Offenders: Sentencing: Capital Punishment
Criminal Law & Procedure: Interrogation: Voluntariness
Criminal Law & Procedure: Accusatory Instruments: Indictments: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Discovery & Inspection: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Discovery & Inspection: Brady Materials: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Preliminary Proceedings: Entry of Pleas: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Pretrial Motions & Procedures: Continuances
Criminal Law & Procedure: Pretrial Motions & Procedures: Joinder & Severance: Joinder of Defendants
Criminal Law & Procedure: Double Jeopardy: Double Jeopardy Protection: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Guilty Pleas: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Guilty Pleas: Enforcement of Plea Agreements
Criminal Law & Procedure: Guilty Pleas: Knowing & Intelligent Requirement
Criminal Law & Procedure: Guilty Pleas: Voluntariness
Criminal Law & Procedure: Counsel: Costs & Attorney Fees
Criminal Law & Procedure: Counsel: Effective Assistance: Sentencing
Criminal Law & Procedure: Counsel: Right to Counsel: Preliminary Proceedings
Criminal Law & Procedure: Juries & Jurors: Challenges for Cause: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Juries & Jurors: Challenges for Cause: Bias & Impartiality: Capital Cases
Criminal Law & Procedure: Juries & Jurors: Challenges to Jury Venire: Bias & Prejudice: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Juries & Jurors: Challenges to Jury Venire: Death Penalty: General Overview
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Criminal Law & Procedure: Juries & Jurors: Disqualification & Removal of Jurors: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Juries & Jurors: Jury Deliberations: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Juries & Jurors: Jury Deliberations: Deadlocked Juries
Criminal Law & Procedure: Juries & Jurors: Jury Deliberations: Directing Further Deliberations
Criminal Law & Procedure: Juries & Jurors: Jury Questions to the Court: Clarification of Instructions
Criminal Law & Procedure: Juries & Jurors: Province of Court & Jury: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Juries & Jurors: Voir Dire: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Juries & Jurors: Waiver of Jury Trial: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Jurisdiction & Venue: Jurisdiction
Criminal Law & Procedure: Trials: Closing Arguments
Criminal Law & Procedure: Trials: Closing Arguments: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Trials: Defendant’s Rights: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Trials: Defendant’s Rights: Right to Counsel: Constitutional Right
Criminal Law & Procedure: Trials: Defendant’s Rights: Right to Due Process
Criminal Law & Procedure: Trials: Defendant’s Rights: Right to Fair Trial
Criminal Law & Procedure: Trials: Defendant’s Rights: Right to Remain Silent: Self-Incrimination Privilege
Criminal Law & Procedure: Trials: Motions for Acquittal
Criminal Law & Procedure: Trials: Motions for Mistrial
Criminal Law & Procedure: Witnesses: Criminal Records
Criminal Law & Procedure: Defenses: Coercion & Duress
Criminal Law & Procedure: Scienter: Specific Intent
Criminal Law & Procedure: Jury Instructions: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Jury Instructions: Particular Instructions: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Jury Instructions: Particular Instructions: Allen Charge
Criminal Law & Procedure: Jury Instructions: Particular Instructions: Deadlocked Juries
Criminal Law & Procedure: Jury Instructions: Particular Instructions: Unanimity
Criminal Law & Procedure: Jury Instructions: Particular Instructions: Use of Particular Evidence
Criminal Law & Procedure: Jury Instructions: Requests to Charge
Criminal Law & Procedure: Verdicts: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Verdicts: Unanimity
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S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20
Criminal Law & Procedure: Sentencing: Appeals: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Sentencing: Appeals: Capital Punishment
Criminal Law & Procedure: Sentencing: Appeals: Proportionality & Reasonableness Review
Criminal Law & Procedure: Sentencing: Capital Punishment
Criminal Law & Procedure: Sentencing: Capital Punishment: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Sentencing: Capital Punishment: Aggravating Circumstances
Criminal Law & Procedure: Sentencing: Capital Punishment: Bifurcated Trials
Criminal Law & Procedure: Sentencing: Capital Punishment: Cruel & Unusual Punishment
Criminal Law & Procedure: Sentencing: Capital Punishment: Death-Qualified Jurors
Criminal Law & Procedure: Sentencing: Capital Punishment: Mitigating Circumstances
Criminal Law & Procedure: Sentencing: Capital Punishment: Stays of Execution
Criminal Law & Procedure: Sentencing: Concurrent Sentences
Criminal Law & Procedure: Sentencing: Credits
Criminal Law & Procedure: Sentencing: Cruel & Unusual Punishment
Criminal Law & Procedure: Sentencing: Guidelines: Adjustments & Enhancements: Criminal History: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Sentencing: Guidelines: Adjustments & Enhancements: Criminal History: Prior Felonies
Criminal Law & Procedure: Sentencing: Imposition
Criminal Law & Procedure: Sentencing: Imposition: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Sentencing: Imposition: Evidence
Criminal Law & Procedure: Sentencing: Imposition: Factors
Criminal Law & Procedure: Sentencing: Imposition: Victim Statements
Criminal Law & Procedure: Sentencing: Mental Incapacity
Criminal Law & Procedure: Sentencing: Multiple Convictions
Criminal Law & Procedure: Sentencing: Plea Agreements
Criminal Law & Procedure: Sentencing: Proportionality
Criminal Law & Procedure: Sentencing: Ranges
Criminal Law & Procedure: Postconviction Proceedings: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Postconviction Proceedings: Imprisonment
Criminal Law & Procedure: Postconviction Proceedings: Parole
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S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20
Criminal Law & Procedure: Appeals: Reversible Errors: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Appeals: Standards of Review: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Appeals: Standards of Review: Abuse of Discretion: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Appeals: Standards of Review: Harmless & Invited Errors: General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure: Habeas Corpus: Cognizable Issues: General Overview
Evidence: Hearsay: Exemptions: Confessions: General Overview
Evidence: Procedural Considerations: Exclusion & Preservation by Prosecutor
Evidence: Procedural Considerations: Weight & Sufficiency
Evidence: Relevance: Prior Acts, Crimes & Wrongs
Evidence: Testimony: Experts: Qualifications
Evidence: Testimony: Lay Witnesses: General Overview
Governments: Legislation: Interpretation
Governments: Legislation: Statutes of Limitations: Tolling
Constitutional Law: Congressional Duties & Powers: Ex Post Facto Clause & Bills of Attainder: General Overview
Where the Omnibus Criminal Justice Improvements Act amended former S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20 to prohibit prisoners convicted of murder from receiving work-release credits, good-time credits, or any other credit, such amendment was not an ex post facto law because work and good behavior credits were only cumulative indicia of an inmate’s positive attributes under S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-640, and an inmate’s parole suitability was not prejudiced by his inability to earn those credits Harris v. State, 309 S.C. 466, 424 S.E.2d 509, 1992 S.C. LEXIS 242 (S.C. 1992), overruled in part, In re Mims, 337 S.C. 14, 522 S.E.2d 597, 1999 S.C. LEXIS 159 (S.C. 1999), overruled in part, Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742, 1999 S.C. LEXIS 217 (S.C. 1999).
Subsequent legislation reducing prisoners’ work benefits results in a substantive violation of the ex post facto clauses; however where, at the time defendant committed the murder for which he was serving the sentence in question the law did not allow work credits, the 1986 amendment to S. C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(A) providing that the mandatory sentence for murder could not be reduced by any credits did not constitute ex post facto legislation as to him. Elmore v. State, 305 S.C. 456, 409 S.E.2d 397, 1991 S.C. LEXIS 197 (S.C. 1991), overruled in part, In re Mims, 337 S.C. 14, 522 S.E.2d 597, 1999 S.C. LEXIS 159 (S.C. 1999), overruled in part, Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742, 1999 S.C. LEXIS 217 (S.C. 1999).
Defendant was not entitled to be sentenced under the 1986 amendment to S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(A), which provided for a 10-year increase in prison time before a convicted murderer would be eligible for parole, where he committed the murder before the amendment became effective, as application of the statute to defendant would violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws contained in both USCS Const. Art. I, § 9, Cl 13 and USCS Const. Art. I, § 10, Cl 1 and S.C. Const. art. I, § 4. Further, defendant’s assumption that the extra 10 years would act as “additional mitigation” was fundamentally flawed, as punishment for a crime could not serve as a mitigating sentencing consideration. State v. Matthews, 296 S.C. 379, 373 S.E.2d 587, 1988 S.C. LEXIS 118 (S.C. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1091, 109 S. Ct. 1559, 103 L. Ed. 2d 861, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 1557 (U.S. 1989).
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S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20
State was properly prohibited from seeking the death penalty against defendant for a murder he allegedly committed nine months before the enactment of the death penalty provisions of S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20 et seq. on June 8, 1977; because there was no operative death penalty statute in South Carolina when the crime was allegedly committed, defendant’s act could not trigger the death penalty without violating the ex post facto prohibition against retroactive laws creating a greater punishment than would have attached under the law at the time of the offense. State v. Logan, 277 S.C. 252, 286 S.E.2d 125, 1982 S.C. LEXIS 245 (S.C. 1982).
Continuous existence since 1869 of statutes in South Carolina declaring that the penalty for murder was death was insufficient to permit the State to seek the death penalty against defendant for a murder allegedly committed nine months before the enactment of the death penalty provisions of S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20 et seq. on June 8, 1977; no South Carolina statute permitted the death penalty for murder at the time of defendant’s offense because the mandatory death penalty provisions of former S.C. Code § 16-52, as amended in 1974, had been declared unconstitutional before he allegedly committed the offense. State v. Logan, 277 S.C. 252, 286 S.E.2d 125, 1982 S.C. LEXIS 245 (S.C. 1982).
State could not seek the death penalty against defendant for a crime he committed after the mandatory death penalty provisions of former S.C. Code § 16-52, as amended in 1974, had been declared unconstitutional, but before the death penalty provisions of S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20 et seq. were enacted; although only the provisions for enforcement had been declared unconstitutional and not the death penalty itself, the mere declaration that the punishment for murder was death, with no means or authority to enforce it, could not serve to warn a defendant that the State might seek the death penalty if he committed murder. State v. Logan, 277 S.C. 252, 286 S.E.2d 125, 1982 S.C. LEXIS 245 (S.C. 1982).
Constitutional Law: The Judiciary: Case or Controversy: Constitutionality of Legislation: General Overview
Death penalty statutory complex, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-3-20 through 16-3-28, is constitutional and a sentence of death may be lawfully imposed pursuant to the statutory complex. State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799, 1979 S.C. LEXIS 434 (S.C. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 957, 100 S. Ct. 437, 62 L. Ed. 2d 329, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 3777 (U.S. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1026, 100 S. Ct. 690, 62 L. Ed. 2d 660 (U.S. 1980).
Death sentence provision of former S.C. Code Ann. § 16-52 (now S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20) was unconstitutional; therefore, defendant’s death sentence for his murder conviction was reversed, and the trial court was instructed to sentence him to life imprisonment. State v. Gaskins, 270 S.C. 296, 242 S.E.2d 220, 1978 S.C. LEXIS 467 (S.C. 1978).
Where, after defendant had been tried, convicted of murder, and sentenced to death, former S.C. Code § 16-52 (now S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20), referred to as the Act of 1974, under which the proceedings were held, was declared unconstitutional, defendant’s murder conviction was affirmed, but his case was remanded to the trial court for the purpose of sentencing defendant to life imprisonment, which was constitutional. State v. Wakefield, 270 S.C. 293, 242 S.E.2d 219, 1978 S.C. LEXIS 532 (S.C. 1978).
Constitutional Law: The Judiciary: Case or Controversy: Ripeness
Because a determination of the retroactive application of the death penalty statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20, was abstract and advisory, rather than being ripe for adjudication, the relief sought by a purported class representative was beyond the scope of a declaratory judgment. Hitter v. McLeod, 274 S.C. 616, 266 S.E.2d 418, 1980 S.C. LEXIS 374 (S.C. 1980).
Constitutional Law: Bill of Rights: Fundamental Rights: Criminal Process: Assistance of Counsel
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State supreme court’s determination that an inmate’s lack of a prior criminal record, which was a mitigating circumstance under S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(1), was irrelevant to the issue of whether the inmate was prejudiced by counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to request an instruction during the inmate’s capital sentencing hearing was contrary to, and involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law because the state supreme court failed to evaluate the totality of available mitigation evidence in reweighing it against the evidence in aggravation. Williams v. Ozmint, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35867 (D.S.C. May 31, 2006), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 494 F.3d 478, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 17934 (4th Cir. S.C. 2007).
Trial court’s instruction that defendant not speak to his attorney during a 15-minute recess between his direct testimony and his testimony on cross-examination did not violate defendant’s constitutional right to counsel. State v. Perry, 278 S.C. 490, 299 S.E.2d 324, 1983 S.C. LEXIS 209 (S.C.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 908, 103 S. Ct. 1881, 76 L. Ed. 2d 811, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 4423 (U.S. 1983).
Constitutional Law: Bill of Rights: Fundamental Rights: Criminal Process: Cruel & Unusual Punishment
S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)’s requirement that the trial court rather than a jury conduct the sentencing in a capital case did not deprive defendant of due process in violation of U.S. Const. amend. XIV, nor did it result in cruel and unusual punishment in violation of U.S. Const. amend. VIII; the trial judge considered mitigating evidence. State v. Allen, 386 S.C. 93, 687 S.E.2d 21, 2009 S.C. LEXIS 526 (S.C. 2009), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 929, 130 S. Ct. 3329, 176 L. Ed. 2d 1229, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 4276 (U.S. 2010).
Because the death penalty statute, former S.C. Code Ann. § 16-52 (now S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20), was unconstitutional to the extent it required mandatory death for conviction of certain homicidal offenses, which included murder while in the commission of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, the offense of which defendant was convicted, defendant’s death sentence was reversed and the case was remanded to the lower court for the purpose of sentencing defendant to life imprisonment. State v. Davis, 267 S.C. 283, 227 S.E.2d 662, 1976 S.C. LEXIS 239 (S.C. 1976).
Mandatory imposition of death penalty under the aggravated circumstances enumerated in former S.C. Code Ann. § 16-52 (now S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20) was unconstitutional because it did not permit the exercise of controlled discretion to impose a lesser sentence, which violated the USCS Const. Amend. 8. State v. Rumsey, 267 S.C. 236, 226 S.E.2d 894, 1976 S.C. LEXIS 232 (S.C. 1976).
S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(A) is constitutional as applied to juveniles because it is clear that neither the Eighth Amendment nor the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Miller speaks directly to the issue of the constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences. State v. Smith, 428 S.C. 417, 836 S.E.2d 348, 2019 S.C. LEXIS 111 (S.C. 2019).
Constitutional Law: Bill of Rights: Fundamental Rights: Criminal Process: Right to Jury Trial
Voir dire examination upon the issue of capital punishment was essential to accomplish the legislative aim of S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(E), which was to assure a jury capable of performing its duty under the law, and that provision does not offend USCS Const. Amend. 14, § 1. State v. Truesdale, 278 S.C. 368, 296 S.E.2d 528, 1982 S.C. LEXIS 439 (S.C. 1982).
Although defendant’s conviction for murder in the commission of armed robbery was proper, his mandatory death sentence pursuant to former S.C. Code Ann.§ 16-52 (now S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20) was defective and required resentencing. State v. Davis, 267 S.C. 456, 229 S.E.2d 592, 1976 S.C. LEXIS 262 (S.C. 1976).
Constitutional Law: Equal Protection: Scope of Protection
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S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20
Former provision in S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-40, which provided for tolling of the applicable statute of limitations for an action accruing while a person was incarcerated for a term less than life, did not deny an inmate his right to equal protection. Although the inmate, who was serving time for murder, was eligible for parole after 20 years under S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20, an award of parole was discretionary under S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-640, even after the inmate became eligible; thus, the inmate’s status was not the same as that of a person serving a definite term of 20 years. Merriman v. Minter, 298 S.C. 110, 378 S.E.2d 441, 1989 S.C. LEXIS 54 (S.C. 1989).
Defendant was properly convicted of driving under the influence because the difference in voir dire procedures for capital cases did not deprive him of equal protection. The difference between S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(D), which specifically allows defense counsel in capital cases to examine any person called as a juror, and S.C. Code Ann. § 14-7-1020, which requires the trial court, on motion of either party, to examine the jury panel, is rationally related to the achievement of legitimate State goals. State v. Brown, 274 S.C. 592, 266 S.E.2d 415, 1980 S.C. LEXIS 380 (S.C. 1980).
Criminal Law & Procedure: Criminal Offenses: Crimes Against Persons: Assault & Battery: General Overview
Trial court did not err in failing to grant a directed verdict on an assault and battery with intent to kill charge because the jury could infer that defendant acted with malice aforethought where defendant swerved while accelerating and laughed as the victim was dragged underneath the automobile, and an automobile had been deemed a dangerous instrumentality. State v. Wilds, 355 S.C. 269, 584 S.E.2d 138, 2003 S.C. App. LEXIS 113 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003).
Criminal Law & Procedure: Criminal Offenses: Crimes Against Persons: Domestic Offenses: Children: General Overview
Because homicide by child abuse was not a lesser included offense of murder under either the elements test or the historical antecedent test, the trial judge did not err in denying defendant’s request to submit homicide by child abuse, under S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-85, as a lesser included offense of murder under S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-10 after defendant shook, squeezed, slapped, punched, bit, strangled, and beat his infant daughter to death in an apparent fit of rage when she would not stop crying. State v. Northcutt, 372 S.C. 207, 641 S.E.2d 873, 2007 S.C. LEXIS 64 (S.C. 2007).
Criminal Law & Procedure: Criminal Offenses: Crimes Against Persons: Kidnapping: General Overview
S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-910 prevents the imposition of a life imprisonment sentence for kidnapping if the defendant has also been sentenced for murder pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20. State v. Stroman, 281 S.C. 508, 316 S.E.2d 395, 1984 S.C. LEXIS 299 (S.C. 1984).
Where defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20 precluded a life imprisonment sentence for kidnapping. State v. Perry, 278 S.C. 490, 299 S.E.2d 324, 1983 S.C. LEXIS 209 (S.C.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 908, 103 S. Ct. 1881, 76 L. Ed. 2d 811, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 4423 (U.S. 1983).
Where defendants were convicted of armed robbery, kidnapping, and murder, imposition of a life sentence for kidnapping was error under S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-910. State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 300 S.E.2d 63, 1982 S.C. LEXIS 481 (S.C. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1103, 103 S. Ct. 1802, 76 L. Ed. 2d 367 (U.S. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1214, 103 S. Ct. 3553, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1399, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 4719 (U.S. 1983).
Criminal Law & Procedure: Criminal Offenses: Crimes Against Persons: Robbery: General Overview
Page 12 of 65
S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20
Petitioner was entitled to a new trial on the armed robbery conviction against him; the State’s failure to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence in the form of a bag found near the register meant that the State committed a Brady violation because a reasonable possibility existed that petitioner would have been found not guilty of the armed robbery charge had the existence of the bag been disclosed, and the violation was material since the State used the armed robbery charge to serve as an aggravating circumstance allowing the State to seek the death penalty. Simpson v. Moore, 367 S.C. 587, 627 S.E.2d 701, 2006 S.C. LEXIS 46 (S.C. 2006).
Because the death penalty statute, former S.C. Code Ann. § 16-52 (now S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20), was unconstitutional to the extent it required mandatory death for conviction of certain homicidal offenses, which included murder while in the commission of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, the offense of which defendant was convicted, defendant’s death sentence was reversed and the case was remanded to the lower court for the purpose of sentencing defendant to life imprisonment. State v. Davis, 267 S.C. 283, 227 S.E.2d 662, 1976 S.C. LEXIS 239 (S.C. 1976).
Criminal Law & Procedure: Criminal Offenses: Homicide: Murder: General Overview
Because homicide by child abuse was not a lesser included offense of murder under either the elements test or the historical antecedent test, the trial judge did not err in denying defendant’s request to submit homicide by child abuse, under S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-85, as a lesser included offense of murder under S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-10 after defendant shook, squeezed, slapped, punched, bit, strangled, and beat his infant daughter to death in an apparent fit of rage when she would not stop crying. State v. Northcutt, 372 S.C. 207, 641 S.E.2d 873, 2007 S.C. LEXIS 64 (S.C. 2007).
Defendant’s indictment was sufficient because it cited the statutory section that he violated and informed him of the elements of murder. The case was remanded for a new sentencing proceeding because the State failed to grant a motion for continuance to allow defendant to investigate a document which the State intended to present at sentencing. State v. Owens, 346 S.C. 637, 552 S.E.2d 745, 2001 S.C. LEXIS 161 (S.C. 2001), overruled in part, State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93, 610 S.E.2d 494, 2005 S.C. LEXIS 69 (S.C. 2005).
Where defendant was convicted of murdering his estranged wife and her daughter’s fiance and was also convicted of assault and battery with intent to kill for his attack on the daughter, after a jury found the statutory aggravating circumstance that two or more persons were murdered by the defendant by one act or pursuant to one scheme, S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(9), defendant’s convictions and the imposition of the death penalty were proper. State v. Kelly, 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99, 1998 S.C. LEXIS 86 (S.C. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1077, 119 S. Ct. 816, 142 L. Ed. 2d 675, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 255 (U.S. 1999).
In a murder trial, it was not error for a trial court to disallow appellant’s request to ask jurors whether they would consider that appellant did not have a significant prior criminal history of violence because failure to ask did not render his trial fundamentally unfair. Defendant is only entitled to specific questions only if the failure to ask them would render his trial “fundamentally unfair”. S.C. Code Ann. § 14-7-1020. State v. Hill, 331 S.C. 94, 501 S.E.2d 122, 1998 S.C. LEXIS 107 (S.C.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1043, 119 S. Ct. 597, 142 L. Ed. 2d 539, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 7990 (U.S. 1998).
Consolidating defendant’s direct appeal with the mandatory review of his sentence of death for murder, S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-25(C), the Supreme Court of South Carolina concluded that, based on evidence that defendant broke into a person’s home, stole personal items, brutally killed the person, hid her body in the woods, and stole her car, any error in a ruling by a trial court that the evidence was enough to submit to the jury the statutory aggravating circumstance established by S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(9) was harmless because the jury found three statutory aggravating circumstances under S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)(b), -(c), -d, and the failure of one aggravating circumstance did not so taint the proceedings as to require reversal where there remained a valid aggravating circumstance upon which a sentence of death was based. State v. Tucker, 324 S.C. 155, 478 S.E.2d 260, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 189 (S.C. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1200, 117 S. Ct. 1561, 137 L. Ed. 2d 708, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 2739 (U.S. 1997).
